







































（1）a. Peter: Would you like something to eat?




































（2）a. How is Jane feeling after her first year at university?




何に十分なのかが分からない。さらには She didn’t get enough unitsの部分と、




（3）a.［JANE1 DIDNʼT PASS ENOUGH UNIVERSITY COURSE UNITS TO
QUALIFY FOR ADMISSION TO SECOND YEAR STUDY］P & AS A
RESULT OF P JANE1 CANNOT CONTINUE WITH UNIVERSITY
STUDY］















































に決定する narrow context（狭義のコンテクスト）と語用論に関わる broad
context（広義のコンテクスト）との 2つに分け、前者の機能を意味論に含んで
いる。
There are two sorts of contextual information, one much more restricted in
scope and limited in role than the other. Information that plays the limited role
of combining with linguistic information to determine content（in the sense of
fixing it）is restricted to a short list of variables, such as the identity of the
speaker and the hearer and the time and place of an utterance. Contextual
information in the broad sense is anything that the hearer is to take into account
to determine（in the sense of ascertain）the speakerʼs communicative intention.
It is often said thatwhat a speaker means “depends on context,” is “determined
by context” or is “a matter of context,” but this is not narrow context in the
semantically relevant sense discussed above.（Bach 1997: 39）
たとえば、Iは話し手を示し、nowは発話時を示すというように、狭義のコンテ
クストによって、話し手の意図とは切り離して自動的に指示内容が決定される
ことになる。I, today, hereなどの pure indexicalsに対して、heとか sheなど











発話時である（2009年 4月 10日午後 2時）に、それぞれ自動的に決定されると
すると、この文の意味は偽となってしまう。「私」は「なおこ」であるし、「今」






First, there is the question of how far, on any given occasion of use, the bounds
of the reference of ʻhereʼ and ʻnowʼ extend. The possible referents of a token of
ʻhereʼ include the very section of space occupied by the speakerʼs body at the
time of utterance（rather unlikely to be the intended referent）through
increasingly more inclusive areas（the room inwhich the utterance occurs, the
building, institution, town, country, etc.）, up to（and perhaps beyond）our




「ここ」という場所を指す可能性がある。レカナティも here や now などの
pure indexicalsについて、広義のコンテクストに頼らずに、狭義のコンテクス
トだけで指示内容を決定することはできないと主張している。
We encounter the same problem even with expressions like here and now,
which Kaplan classifies as pure indexicals（as opposed to demonstratives）.
Their semantic value is said to be the time or place of the context respectively.
But what counts as the time and place of the context? How inclusive must the
time or place in question be? It depends on what the speaker means, hence,
語用論と意味論の違い（岡田聡宏）
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again, on thewide context. We can maintain that the character of here and now
is the rule that the expression refers to “the” time or “the” place of the context
− a rule that automatically determines a content, given a（narrow）context in
which the time and place parameters are given specific values; but then we
have to let a pragmatic process take place to fix the values in question, that is,
to determine which narrow context, among indefinitely many candidates
compatiblewith the facts of the utterance, serves as argument to the character
function.On the resulting view, the（narrow）contextwith respect towhich an
utterance is interpreted is not given, not determined automatically by
objective facts like where and when the utterance takes place, but it is
determined by the speakerʼs intention and thewide context.Againwe reach the
conclusion that, formal tricks notwithstanding, pragmatic interpretation has a
role to play in determining the content of the utterance.（Recanati 2006b:
453-454）
















The most salient feature of Semantic Minimalism is that it recognizes few
context sensitive expressions, and hence, acknowledges a very limited effect
of the context of utterance on the semantic content of an utterance. The only
context sensitive expressions are the completely obvious ones（ʻIʼ, ʻhereʼ, ʻnowʼ,
ʻthatʼ, etc.,（essentially those Kaplan lists in ʻDemonstrativesʼ,（1989, p. 489）.
These are not only obvious, they also pass certain tests for context sensitivity
we spell out below.






（6）a. He is ready.
b. She is too tall.













But look at our tests: we take it as obvious that anyone reporting Aʼs utterance
can accurately utter ʻA said that Rudolf is tallʼ and this is so regardless of the
context the reporter happens to find herself in, i.e., even if the context of the
report and the context of the reported utterance are relevantly different, i.e.,
even if giraffes are not particularly salient in the context of the report. The
reporter might not know that Rudolf is a giraffe; she might be unsure what kind
of animal Rudolf is; or suspect he is a reindeer.The point is this: If the context of
the first utterance and the context of the second utterance are relevantly
dissimilar, then this report ought to be impossible − if ʻtallʼ really is context
sensitive.（Cappelen and Lepore 2005b: 7）
カプランとレポアによると、もしある表現が本質的にコンテクストの影響を受
けない（context insensitive）表現である場合、どのようなコンテクストでも間


















Thus they hold that, if we put tense aside, sentences like ʻJohn is readyʼ or ʻsteel
is strong enoughʼ, which most theorists consider context-sensitive, actually
express complete propositions independent of context. To be sure, such
sentences invite the question: ʻfor what?ʼ（ʻready for what? ʻstrong enough for
what?ʼ）, and it is the context that enables us to answer such questions; but
Cappelen and Lepore hold that the sentences nevertheless express complete
propositions independent of context. Which propositions? They donʼt tell us.
They say itʼ s an issue for the metaphysician, not the semanticist. The
semanticist ought to be content with biconditionals such as: ‘Steel is strong
enough’ is true if and only if steel is strong enough, and ‘John is ready’ is true if


























（7）（a）Derek Bentley: ʻLet him have it, Chris.ʼ
（b）DB told Chris to let the policeman have the gun.
（c）DB told Chris to shoot the policeman.










As with the fixing of values of indexicals in the process of utterance
comprehension, disambiguation（or sense selection）is dependent on consider-
ations of the speakerʼs communicative intentions, hence on wide context, so
『言語・文化・社会』第 8号
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presents yet another respect in which C&Lʼs semantic contents … are in fact




















































Thus the original notion of semantics（as applied to thought, and perhaps
certain artificial languages）, concerning a relation between representations and
states of affairs, is inevitably altered when it is applied to natural languages.
Semantics understood as linguistically encoded meaning（LEM, or semantic
『言語・文化・社会』第 8号
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character, or formal signification）cannot but part company from semantics




Chomsky（1995, 1996）has suggested that there is little basis for a
reference-based semantics of linguistic expressions and that natural language
probably has only syntax and pragmatics. On this view, LEM is simply the
ultimate representational output of the language faculty or grammar, a








We can maintain both that semantics determines truth conditions and that, in
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Central to the formal semantics tradition, especially to the tradition of truth
conditional semantics, has been the equation of the meaning of a sentence with
its truth condition (the condition under which a given proposition is true). Some
semanticists believe that the sentence meaning is identical to the proposition of
the sentence, and the proposition is determined exclusively by semantics
without relying on pragmatics, except in very limited cases. Pragmaticists or
contextualists, on the other hand, claim that the recovery of the proposition
inevitably involves pragmatic processes, and it cannot be determined without
considering the context. The sentence meaning itself is incomplete in many
ways, because it contains underdetermined elements including indexicals and
demonstratives as well as ambiguous words or phrases. It needs to be
developed by such pragmatic processes as reference assignment, disambigua-
tion, and saturation in order to be a full-fledged proposition.
In her ultra-minimalist view, Carston (2007) claims that semantics is concerned
only with LEM (Linguistically Encoded Meaning), which is the only context-free
meaning, and that the semantics/pragmatics distinction for at least natural
languages holds between LEM and speaker meaning. She also claims that LEM
is the ultimate representational output of grammar, and that the only distinction
that works may be a syntax/pragmatics distinction. More careful examination
may be needed before we accept her claim, but it is true that semantics has no
autonomous role in determining the truth condition of a sentence, and the
recovery of the proposition always involves pragmatic processes.
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